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1. Introduction 
 
Encouraging the right type of investment is essential to the success of any 
energy policy. Suitable investments would maintain low prices, achieve 
reductions in emissions, and keep the lights on (Warren, 2014). The World 
Energy Council has identified supply, pricing, and emissions as the three major 
global energy concerns, termed within the industry as ‘the energy trilemma’. 
However, establishing a suitable energy policy is subject to complex regulatory 
systems, which both impose controls on prices to consumers and set out 
environmental targets for companies. This can be specific to a particular 
country. In the energy industry, any type of change requires complicated 
discussions and debates with regulators, politicians and generators. Although 
the relative dominance of each group of actors varies across the world, each 
country faces a similar problem: how to balance the energy trilemma.  
  
The energy trilemma is recognised as an urgent problem in Great Britain (GB)1, 
the geographical setting for this case study. It is urgent because energy prices 
for consumers rose during the main data collection period for the case study, 
2006-2014 (DECC2, 2014a), while security of supply is an unresolved issue 
(OFGEM3, 2012, Johnson, 2014, Grigorjeva, 2015, Yiakoumi and Rouaix, 2016, 
DBEIS 4 , 2017). In 2011, the industry regulators acknowledged that the 
country’s market energy structure was no longer fit for purpose (DECC, 2011), 
highlighting the distinct lack of significant new investment. According to the 
DECC (2014b), the requirement for reduced emissions is the only component of 
the energy trilemma that is currently being achieved. This has led to public 
outrage, and questions over why such a crucial commodity as electricity is 
apparently being irresponsibly managed (Inman, 2014; Morison, 2014). 
Appreciation of the significance of lack of investment is central to understanding 
the energy trilemma. As Falkner (2014:188) argues, “energy is central to the 
survival and prosperity of human society”.   
 
During the period covered by the study, the industry argued that the laissez-
faire approach by the Government regarding investment in new power plants 
discouraged capital investment. We examine how senior managers at the 
electricity generation companies used accounting in communications with 
regulators and governments when seeking change.  In particular, we 
investigate the extent to which senior managers used accounting techniques 
                                                 
1 The paper will refer to GB when discussing investment problems because Ireland has a separate 
energy system, which is regulated by its own body. 
2 DECC is a department called the ‘Department of Energy and Climate Change’.  
3 Ofgem - Office for Gas and Electricity Markets. 
4 Department that was created after DECC.  DEBIS is the ‘Department of Energy, Business and Industrial 
Strategy’. 
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strategically during the implementation of the revised Large Combustion Plant 
Directive (LCPD). The LCPD is a European directive aimed at reducing nitrogen 
oxide (NOx), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and dust emissions to combat environmental 
problems such as acid rain. Their conduct was calculated both to transform the 
structures within which they had to work, and to change the conduct of others.  
 
In response to the call for studies which focus on the role of a knowledgeable 
agency in the analysis of strategic conduct (Englund Gerdin and Burns, 2011; 
Roberts, 2014; Coad, Jack and Kholeif., 2016), we focus on the roles of 
knowledgeable agents in using contradictory structures to generate conflict. We 
observed agents using their knowledge of those structures and of the actions of 
others in a deliberate way. Agency concerns how they actively influence, 
motivate, start an argument or discussion, and whether outcomes are intended 
or unintended. As Stones has argued, conduct analysis examines how we feel 
when things are against us, in relation to established norms (Stones and Jack, 
2016). The changes in this case study do not concern accounting systems but 
rather the accountability of investment decisions, thereby using strategic 
conduct to assess strategic behaviour. Therefore, we will be drawing on 
Giddens’ original Structuration Theory (ST) and building on Stones’ (2005) 
development of the knowledgeability of agency. This enables us to contribute to 
the development of structuration theory in accounting research by analysing 
how people use accounting to control and change others (Coad et al., 2016). 
Therefore, our main themes are: 
1) How did the agents think about the context? 
2) How did the agents plan their conduct? 
3) What actions were taken using capital budgeting? 
4) What were the outcomes of actions based on knowledge? 
The theoretical contribution emerging from the analysis and interpretation of the 
case study strengthens our understanding of how change can be accounted for 
using strategic conduct analysis. A principal criticism of Giddens’ ST is that it is 
often used to demonstrate how institutions become established and maintained, 
but not how structures and actions adjust over time. This is attributable to the 
underdeveloped epistemology of the original theory, and its concept of strategic 
conduct analysis. How particular agents draw strategically on their knowledge 
of structure and the conduct of others when they attempt to alter the 
knowledgeability and perspectives of other agents, shows how structures might 
become altered.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 examines the 
capital budgeting literature; Section 3 introduces the methods employed within 
this case study research; Section 4 provides an overview of the theory; Section 
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5 describes the background to the environmental regulations imposed in the 
UK; Section 6 presents the case study; Section 7 is the discussion, and Section 
8 provides the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature 
Investing in capital projects, such as power stations, is a complex process. 
Management accounting offers many numerical techniques that aid capital 
budgeting for decision-making in such projects. CIMA (2009) found that 60% of 
organisations use Net Present Value (NPV), 55% use the payback method, 
43% use Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and 18% use the Accounting Rate of 
Return (ARR) for capital budgeting analysis. These are often referred to as the 
traditional methods, whilst other more sophisticated methods, such as Real 
Options, sit outside that group. Only two are based on the use of discounted 
cash flows: NPV and Real Options. NPV is the most prevalent method 
encountered in our study. 
Alkaraan and Northcott (2006) state that Strategic Investment Decisions (SIDs) 
can be distinguished from operational investments by considering level of risk, 
intangible outcomes, the size of investment, and long-term impact on company 
performance. The majority of SIDs use capital budgeting as a decision making 
tool; the basic definition of capital budgeting is “a process concerned with 
decision making in respect of specific investment project choices and the total 
amount of capital expenditure to commit” (CIMA, 2008:7). However, when 
dealing with high levels of risk-taking, the process can be much more complex 
than the definition suggests.  Pfeiffer and Schneider (2010:1) extend the basic 
definition of capital budgeting and propose a process of capital budgeting that 
“defines a set of rules to govern the way in which managers at different levels of 
the hierarchy produce and share information about investment projects”. This 
could be extended to encompass the entire communication process within the 
organisational field, including with regulators. The investment decision-making 
process also includes the assessment of human behaviour and individuals’ 
resources, as well as those of the organisation itself and the institution 
surrounding it.  
Emmanuel, Harris and Komakeck. (2010) argue that every capital investment 
decision involves uncertainty, particularly those that are innovative in nature; 
here, we argue that the presence of new regulations can be equally problematic 
when engaging in strategic decisions. Of course, the literature has 
demonstrated that capital budgeting techniques are not just used as decision-
making tools, just as this paper demonstrates that information from capital 
budgeting can be used to produce change in the structure, knowledgeability 
and processes of the market. Others have shown that it can be used as a tool 
for mediating (Miller and O’Leary, 2007) and legitimising (Moll and Hoque, 
2011). Jones and Dugdale (1994) find that field and practitioner narratives have 
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been explaining the wider use of investment decisions for some time. They 
noted that previous scholars had called for more work on the strategic nature 
(Scapens et al., 1982, as cited in Jones and Dugdale, 1994) of using capital 
investment techniques and consideration of processes as a whole (King, 1975, 
as cited in Jones and Dugdale, 1994).  
Looking first at the general literature on investment decision-making, work on 
the energy sector is sparse in business journals but has received more 
coverage in policy and utilities journals. For example, Peng and Poudineh 
(2017) examined the use of investment vehicles in the developing sector in 
Tanzania to fund increased plant capacity in a state-owned utility company 
through independent power plants, energy power producers, small power 
producers and the increase in public-private partnerships with mainly Chinese 
companies.  Although this paper does not examine the decision-making 
process itself, it does highlight the growing dependency on government and 
international partnership investments. This is very similar to the current 
proposals for a new nuclear plant (EDF, 2018) in the United Kingdom (UK). The 
majority of papers in this area examine investment patterns using econometric 
modelling. In a study of the sector in Germany, Cullman and Nieswand (2016) 
conclude that generators increase their investment in the base year of incentive 
regulation, but do not examine how these decisions were brought about.  
Pineau, Rasata and Zaccour (2011) use stochastic modelling for prediction 
purposes. They found that within a Finnish, oligopolistic market, it was difficult 
to predict choice in technology because the model had incomplete information 
on how the players determined their choices. These studies point to the lack of 
studies into how investment decisions are made. They also highlight the fact 
that investment problems in the energy industry are common across countries. 
Within business journals, some studies have considered investment in the 
electricity sector. Warren, Quinn and Kristandl (2018) examined the influence of 
financialisation on investment decisions in GB from 1960 to 2010.  Using a 
similar methodology to ours, it was found that the common logic that underpins 
investment practices in GB have changed over the period examined. They 
emphasise that it is necessary to understand political-economic and institutional 
change in the UK to fully appreciate how and why investments are made in this 
industry. They also found that the use of accounting in investment has to some 
extent been a contributory factor to the power supply problems now faced by 
the British public. However, they do not address the problems that have 
occurred following 2010 or the decision-making process itself. In a similar vein 
Warren and Seal (2018) consider the performative properties of the discounted 
cash flow model, reconnecting politics and the economy. 
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Despite the extensive literature in the area of investment appraisal (for example 
Pike and Wolfe, 1987; Northcott, 1991; Sangster, 1993; Sandahl and Sjogren, 
2003; Ekanem, 2005 & 2007; Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006; Kerler, Fleming 
and Allport, 2013; Elmassri, Harris and Carter 2016 and Harris, Northcott, 
Elmassri and Huikku, 2016), capital budgeting has received limited attention 
(Miller and O’Leary, 2007). This is surprising, since Bower (cited in Miller and 
O’Leary, 2007) identified a distinct need to address the process of capital 
budgeting in 1972, and Jones and Dugdale (1994) questioned the academic 
focus on application and technique rather than the gap between theory and 
practice. This is more surprising when it is considered that capital investment 
decisions are critical to organisations’ future performances (Emmanuel et al. , 
2010), because significant investment is often irreversible due to the enormous 
sunk costs involved (Chittenden and Derregia, 2015). 
  
As capital budgeting evolved from financial economics (Haka, 2007), the 
majority of studies in this area employ methods embedded within a mainstream 
(positivist) methodology (for example see Pike and Wolfe, 1987; Sangster, 
1993; and Alkaraan and Northcott, 2006). Hence, the literature assumes that 
market players pursue their own self-interest to ensure the best possible 
outcomes from all their decisions. For example, the use of NPV implies that if 
an outcome is positive or holds the highest NPV, then acceptance of it will 
provide the best possible results for those who benefit from the cashflow 
surplus to the cost of capital. In addition, traditional economic theory also 
presumes that cash-flow decisions are typically made to maximise owners’ 
wealth, and to provide a basis on which to estimate future costs (Ekanem, 
2005).  
Regulation within the UK energy market is broadly based on the same 
neoclassical economic theory (Bohne, 2011) as capital budgeting. The basic 
foundation is: 1) people have rational preferences regarding the possible 
outcomes; 2) individuals maximise utility, and firms maximise profits; and 3) 
people act independently on the basis of full and relevant information. 
Moreover, within neoclassical economic theory, the effective implementation of 
regulations as a foundation for market structure is assumed; this provides a role 
for politics and public bodies as well as economists (Bohne, 2011). However, 
because market structure has failed to meet the expectations expressed by the 
generation industry, it is necessary to question how this affects capital 
budgeting processes. As Bui and Villers (2017) have found, decisions relating 
to climate change policies often produce conservative strategies. 
The increasing use of regulation to impose political policy and balance macro-
economic concerns raises questions over the role of regulations in decision 
making, especially when they generate greater uncertainty. Even with the 
added use of abandonment and real options theory, accurate prediction in an 
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environment of regulatory uncertainty is unrealistic. As Haka (2007) argues, 
uncertainty is one of the most difficult factors to address when making an 
investment decision, especially when evaluating a long-term investment. 
Uncertainty relates to the variables affecting long-term pricing, market stability, 
and unpredictable future public policies.  
 
According to Elmassri et al. (2016) and Harris et al. (2016), most previous work 
in the area of SIDs has ignored the role of agency and the context of evolving 
and changing external5 structures. In support of this view, Elmassri et al. (2016) 
explain that the very nature of SIDs results in changing structures. The 
understanding of how agents respond to this in their judgments is another 
element missing from the literature in this area. However, as Jones and 
Dugdale (1994) explained, context is a significant factor in how capital 
budgeting would be used in practice. We examine investment appraisal in a 
context that incorporates all the factors arising from environmental regulation, 
the unknowability of future price curves, and, more significantly, the potential for 
future revisions to regulations and energy policies. Uncertainties are known to 
result in companies postponing investments, as has occurred within the GB 
generation industry (Chittenden and Derregia, 2015). 
  
3. Theoretical framework 
Giddens’ work on ST provides a “comprehensive theoretical system which 
theorists love to interpret and contest” (Bryant and Jary, 2011:12). However, it 
also offers an ontological orientation to social life that “has done better than any 
other (meta) theory available” (Bryant and Jary, 2011:12). Nevertheless, 
“structuration theory would be still more effective if it were made easier for 
researchers to move from ontology in general to substantive inquiries … what is 
missing from Giddens’ theory of structuration is concern for the strategic 
context of action.” (Bryant and Jary, 2011:12).  
Giddens’ ST relies on methodological bracketing for the analysis of evidence. 
The focus is either on structure through institutional analysis, or on agency 
through strategic conduct of analysis. Bearing this in mind, Englund et al. 
(2011) identified three core ways in which accounting could be conceptualised; 
1) accounting as a structure; 2) accounting as an artefact; and 3) accounting as 
an interplay between structures and artefacts. While ST has served as the 
foundation of some interesting research in the field of accounting (for example 
Ahrens and Chapman, 2002; Seal, 2003; Seal, Berry and Cullen, 2004; Conrad, 
2005; Jack, 2006; Gurd, 2008; Moore, 2010; Conrad 2013; and Englund, 
                                                 
5 These studies used Strong Structuration Theory (SST), hence the use of the term ‘external structures’. 
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Gerdin and Abrahamsson, 2013), existing studies lack a thorough examination 
of strategic conduct (Englund and Gerdin, 2014; Roberts, 2014). 
 
The lack of strategic conduct studies is partially explained by the fact that 
Giddens’ (1984) own development of structuration placed more weight on 
ontology than epistemology, resulting in strategic conduct analysis being less 
developed and understood. However, Strong Structuration Theory (SST) 
(Stones, 2005), which synthesises critiques of Giddens’ original theory, does 
attempt to develop epistemology and advance empirical study using the theory, 
as it “can translate the ontology of ST into the epistemology and methodological 
understanding required by researchers on the ground” (Jack and Kholeif, 2008: 
30). The dynamic use of SST provides an opportunity to analyse “the issue of 
agency in situ rather than on structure cut off from agency” (Coad et al., 2016). 
Accounting studies applying ST tend to overuse the methodological bracketing 
that focuses on institutional rather than strategic conduct analysis (Englund and 
Gerdin, 2014). 
 
We examine the strategic conduct of the actors/agents within GB’s electricity 
generation industry to understand how they use their knowledge of the 
contextual field to strategically respond to change while lobbying for further 
change. Conduct analysis is when the agent needs to be examined by looking 
inwards, a very different form of methodological bracketing to “when the 
researcher is looking at the actor hermeneutically” (Stones and Jack, 2016: 
1148). The understanding that “what is going on in the heads of people is never 
free-floating… it is always embedded in contextual fields” (Stones and Jack, 
2016: 1149) remains consistent in both ST and SST. Context analysis looks 
outward to what the agents-in-focus perceive as external structure and their 
understanding of the internal structures and conduct of networked others. While 
there have been discussions about whether to use the flat ontology of ST 
(Englund and Gerdin, 2016) or that developed by Stones’ SST (Coad et al., 
2016), there is agreement that both approaches represent “a powerful tool in 
analysing management accounting and changes” (Englund and Gerdin, 2016).  
 
Giddens’ (1979, 1984) theory of structuration is based upon several 
assumptions, two of which are that all social actors are knowledgeable, and that 
actors have a conscious understanding of their actions. An actor's level of 
knowledge is determined by two factors: the unconscious and unacknowledged 
conditions of the unintended consequences of action. ST also assumes that 
social behaviour includes day-to-day actions, which become routine (i.e. 
habits), and that social actors are partly constrained by the structural properties 
of systems. However, it is important to note that although structures provide 
constraints, this does not always result in their acceptance by actors. 
Ultimately, Giddens (1979, 1984) argues that actors are responsible for their 
own behaviour, as society does not represent a sufficient excuse to justify their 
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actions. Agents have the ability to plan their conduct, and do not have to simply 
accept the constraints that surround the decisions they take. 
 
Strategic conduct analysis is defined by Giddens (1984: 378) as “concentrating 
upon how actors reflexively monitor what they do; how they draw upon rules 
and resources in the constitution of interaction”, which focuses on contextually 
situated actions. This type of analysis requires detailed accounts of agents’ 
knowledgeability, motivation, and the dialectic of control. Thus, knowledgeability 
and motivation are central to Giddens’ ontology and strategic conduct. As 
Stones (1996: 43) observes, “The more knowledgeable agents are about their 
conditions of action...then, all things being equal, the less likely they are to 
engage in practices that then lead to unintended consequences”. Part of that 
knowledgeability involves understanding the extent to which domination within 
systems can be countered (Stones, 2005), and actors’ positions regarding the 
ability to enact a dialectic of control. This study observes agents who in one 
context can dominate the decision-making process by virtue of their managerial 
position, but who are subordinate in other contexts (national or European 
regulatory contexts). Thus, they experience the dialectic of control from both 
sides.  
Although Giddens’ (1979) work on the dialectic of control is subject to 
interpretation, this research largely agrees with Nandan (1998) in allowing that 
the term dialectic can refer to shifts in the balance of power over time and 
space, with the associated changes concerning changing circumstances. 
However, Nandan (1998) explains that those changing circumstances represent 
the outcome of knowledgeable, subordinate agents using the (meagre) 
resources they own. Frames of reference are provided by agents’ knowledge of 
rules and routines and the resources available to them, as well as of the 
regulatory environment and its norms and sanctions and patterns of decision-
making involved in capital budgeting. They can then strategically draw on these 
to determine when to exert power, and when to resist (Saravanamuthu and 
Tinker, 2003).  
Stones’ (2005) SST developed Giddens’ (1984) concept of dialectic of control 
into a framework of resistance, using the agent’s context and conduct analyses 
to reveal where, when and why agents choose to avoid control. The approach 
proposed by Stones (2005) involves carrying out an analysis from the position-
practices of one or more agents-in-focus. Stones and Jack (2016) argue that 
the difference between ST and SST in the area of strategic conduct analysis is 
that the design of the project must “include conduct analysis of other actors and 
a deeper hermeneutic analysis of the actors within the structural context” 
(p.1150), thus bringing the actors in situ (Coad et al., 2016). While the authors 
agree that full use of SST can be very insightful, the research design of the 
original case study was based on ST. This paper will therefore retain the 
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concepts of strategic conduct and the dialectic of control by evidencing the 
careful selection of communications. We consider the concept of ‘conduct’ as a 
process that is active, processual and ongoing, not only comprised of individual 
acts or individual documents, but also involving motives, influences, arguments, 
stance taken, and even conspiracies. 
This case study examines the strategic conduct involved in negotiating the 
energy trilemma. The capital budgeting process provides an interesting context 
within which to examine the complexity of the strategic conduct of agents. Our 
case study presents agents’ context analyses of a complex market structure, 
which enabled generators to analyse in turn the strategic conduct that would 
force the Government to listen to their demands for new market structures and 
policies. The generators were able to manipulate industry circumstances to 
achieve reform; as Giddens (1984: 257) argued, the process of power is the 
“capacity to achieve outcomes”. The generators mobilised their power to fight 
against the Government, which in turn sought to distance itself from investment 
in a privatised industry, thus triggering a power shift.  
This case study contributes to the debate by illustrating how generators shifted 
the balance of power by both identifying contradictions within the industry, and 
exploiting changes in the UK economy. This power shift was instigated the 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR), which brought about significant changes to 
the UK market structure.  
 
4. Research Method 
To examine the role of capital budgeting against the backdrop of environmental 
regulations that impose uncertainties on decision makers, we present a 
longitudinal, narrative theorised case study spanning the period 2006 to 2016. 
The research instruments used to collect data for the case study were designed 
to include the collection of both primary and secondary data. Primary data 
comprises mainly semi-structured interviews 6  and public focus groups with 
regulators, politicians, analysts, engineers, accountants, strategic advisors, 
environmental managers and five of the big six energy generators. Initially, all 
six of the energy generators were contacted and interviews arranged; however, 
due to practical timing issues only five were interviewed. The individuals 
interviewed were found through various channels; some were identified as 
knowledgeable in the area being examined at industry conferences, others 
through personal contacts within the industry or through asking interviewees if 
they could recommend others in specific jobs. The semi-structured interviews 
used 15 main interviewees, some of whom were interviewed several times. The 
                                                 
6 Questions provided in the appendix. 
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average duration of each interview was one hour and five minutes. As can be 
seen in Table 1, most of the interviewees had significant industrial experience. 
 
Insert here: Table 1 - Interviewees’ length of time in the industry 
The interviews and secondary data collection took place over a 10-year period, 
although the bulk of the work was carried out between 2008 and 2010. 
However, most interviewees were contacted after this period to confirm 
information from their interviews or to request further clarification on specific 
issues. In addition, two new full interviews in 2016 confirmed market changes 
and the outcomes established in relation to the case study. The interviews were 
all recorded, with the exception of one preliminary phone interview and two 
follow-up interviews. Upon completion of the interviews, they were transcribed 
and a process of thematic analysis used. Following the transcription of each 
interview, the interviewer analysed the transcript to identify emerging themes; 
these helped to inform future interviews without influencing the ability of the 
interviewees to express an opinion.  
Secondary data included additional data obtained from document analysis (e.g., 
White Papers, company reports, industry discussion papers, Government 
minutes from public discussions, and European directive reports). Finally, 
industry conferences were attended annually throughout the data collection 
period, allowing the researchers to follow the changes put forward in policy 
statements. 
 
5. Background 
Before the UK electricity industry was privatised in 1990, the majority of 
investment in the UK energy market centred on the use of coal and oil (Warren 
et al., 2018). However, after privatisation, the 1990s witnessed a rush of new 
investments, relying on low-priced gas as the main fuel (Warren, 2014). 
Following the introduction of a new market structure in 2001,7 six dominant 
competitors emerged; they are vertically integrated to the limits that the 
regulations8 allow. The main generators hold oligopoly power and the network 
is a natural monopoly. Since 2001, electricity has been sold in the same way as 
any other commodity, traded through mechanisms such as spot pricing and 
future contacts. However, unlike other commodities, the risks involved in these 
                                                 
7 New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) - a system that mainly used future contracts. The system 
was introduced to remove the price manipulation associated with the previous system (The Pool 
System). 
8 These competitors cannot operate within the management of energy infrastructure, which in England 
and Wales is owned and operated by the National Grid. 
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future contracts are high, because there is no way of storing electricity. 9 
Consequently, the costs associated with breakdowns are high, and investments 
in the industry reduced significantly over time. The reduction in investments can 
be attributed to rising gas prices and growing uncertainties surrounding the 
increasing number of environmental regulations introduced by the European 
Union (EU) (Warren, 2014; Warren et al., 2018). There is little doubt that the 
new market structure introduced in 2001 increased the complexity of the 
investment decisions within this industry. Uncertainties and risks created 
instability when the Government adopted a laissez-faire approach. However, 
this changed following intense lobbying from the generators alongside 
investment hiatus, which resulted in the introduction of the EMR (2013) in GB.  
The problems discussed in this case study are specific to GB; however, other 
liberalised energy markets face similar problems. Grigorjeva (2015:1) argues 
that “the incompatibility of the still persisting functioning principles of the 
electricity markets with the changed market reality have resulted in serious 
market failures which negatively affect investment climate and therefore pose a 
risk towards the security of supply in the EU.” This case study focuses on 
thermal power within GB, as these were the plants that were affected by the 
LCPD. It is important to note that many other narratives occurred alongside the 
debate we focus on, including the nuclear debate and the carbon tax debate. 
Since 2000, environmental regulation has been a key political issue in the UK 
(Warren et al., 2018). One of the most significant regulations to affect 
investment strategies within GB was the LCPD. The directive is intended to 
protect the public from air pollutants considered to represent health risks 
(European Commission, 2001). 10  Some parties view setting environmental 
targets as a way of winning votes. Consequently, successive Governments 
have focused on policies highlighting a green agenda, leaving general 
investment up to the industry. Since 2000, the energy industry has demanded 
policies that provide certainty on issues, such as which technologies will receive 
Government support in the future, so that they can make investment decisions. 
However, the Government objective was market-led investment. The 
Government wanted to open the markets to encourage broader competition in 
the hope that this would drive prices down and encourage investment; however, 
these are contradictory objectives when investments are long-term. 
Although the LCPD was signed well before this case study began, this directive 
added to the contradictory objectives set out by the Government. The LCPD 
resulted in new targets for reducing emissions, which would ultimately have an 
impact on both prices and new investment. Nevertheless, at the start of the 
                                                 
9 Storage of electricity is one of the biggest research projects in this industry. 
10
 Although some of these references may seem outdated, these were relevant for the decisions made 
within this research. 
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case study and during the data collection phase, how these regulations could 
be met was still a topic of discussion. Investments were still being analysed in 
terms of investment appraisal techniques, and decisions concerning the LCPD 
remained unresolved during the first three years of the study. 
As a result of the LCPD, all installations (coal and oil stations) had to either opt 
in or opt out of the directive. ‘Opting in’ meant the installation would need to 
invest in costly Fuel Gas Desulphurisation (FGD) equipment to reduce pollution, 
on average costing £200 million. ‘Opting out’ would result in the installation only 
being able to operate for 20,000 hours from 2008-2015 until closure. The 
considerations made by generators in relation to their investment decisions 
were not based solely on whether to invest in FDG equipment. Alternative 
investments were considered, such as commissioning new power stations and 
closing old ones. 
The LCPD had a significant impact on the UK energy portfolio. 11,842MW out 
of 33,839MW11 of supply was closed down when generators chose not to make 
new investments (Dukes, 2010). The reduction in MWs entering the system 
created a strain on the supply of electricity, one of the consequences identified 
in the trilemma. The LCPD highlighted a number of problems within the energy 
market, the biggest of which was that as Government policies neither identified 
nor supported the frameworks required to reduce uncertainties, there was a halt 
to investments within the UK (Warren et al., 2018). The EU directive had 
encouraged the UK Government to focus on emissions, resulting in too little 
attention being directed towards supply and pricing.  
 
6. Case study 
This case study is structured as follows: 1) how agents thought about the 
context surrounding the investment decision; 2) how the agents planned their 
conduct; 3) the actions that were taken using capital budgeting; and 4) other 
actions based on knowledge outcomes. We aimed to understand how the 
agents-in-focus thought about the context of the investment, their knowledge of 
the structures and how others would act during the process. The analysis 
shows what the agents felt when the policy changed and they perceived the 
new rules to be working against them. It also examines how they planned their 
conduct to influence, motivate and create discussions to counter to dominant 
groups. The last step is to follow the outcomes of the conduct aimed at shifting 
the balance of power within the industry away from the regulators and towards 
the generators. 
                                                 
11 33,839MW was the amount of supply affected by the LCPD; these decision were taken in 2008. To 
put this into perspective, in the following year (2009-2010), maximum demand in the UK was 60,231 
MW (Dukes, 2010). 
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6.1 Capital budgeting:  how agents thought about their context 
 
When the LCPD was implemented, all the generators who owned power 
stations using coal and oil had to respond to the Environment Agency (EA), 
stating whether or not they intended to invest in the requisite technology to 
reduce emissions. This process required each generator to submit an 
application to the EA under Pollution Prevention Control12 (PPC). However, 
before these submissions could start, a process of reflection on the current 
context of the decision and where the company wanted to be strategically was 
required. 
Capital budgeting played a significant role in this reflection. When making 
investment decisions, one of the roles of capital budgeting is to act as a vehicle 
for communication, drawing on codes from the theory of investment. Accounting 
drove the discussions on how the new regulations would affect the future of the 
company, how their competitors would react and how their decision could 
influence or disrupt the industry going forward:  
We had to sit and think about what we wanted to do…...it was like having 
a crystal ball and somehow we had to give the best advice …..it was a big 
grey area that made us think because there was so much forecasting 
required and uncertainty involved. (Business Service Director) 
The language of investment appraisal (accounting) became dominant in the 
reflection process because it provided a platform where everything could be 
translated into something everyone understood. Regulators accepted this 
approach because they understood that finances would come first for 
generators. One member of the regulatory team (Environment Agency 13 ) 
stated: 
We are interested in the quality and quantity of the investments, but of 
course at the end of the day this has to translate into numbers because 
the numbers have to be justified; they are not going to do it if the 
economics are against it. 
In this case, the values and data for capital budgeting decisions were unknown. 
As a Business Service Director explained: 
                                                 
12 Now called the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED). 
13 In this case study, there are two sets of regulators: the Environment Agency (EA), who were part of 
Stage 1, and the Department of Energy, Climate and Control (DECC) in Stage 2 - the name of this 
department has since changed. 
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The details of the directive were very unclear for a long time; some of the 
fundamentals were missing, like if you opt out and you get 20,000 hours, 
what does that mean? Do the 20,000 hours refer to a ‘unit’ or per ‘site’ - in 
the end it turned out to be per ‘stack’. If you have four flues inside one 
chimney what is that? How can you model the economics of opting in and 
opting out if you don’t know the detail?  
Here, they drew on their knowledge of engineering, legislation and finances to 
make sense of the new rules.  As one Head of Environment explained: 
So we’re in a position of major transition, the industry was 
changing…….we have never done anything quite like this before…...we 
had to sit and think about these changes but also others and the 
future…..what did it all mean for us. 
This was a critical reflective point, because the generators that wanted to opt 
out and hold back investment needed to ensure they could secure as much 
profit as possible during the final stage of a power station’s life before they were 
forced to close it down. It was clear that the generators felt that things were 
working against them and that they had to think about how to overcome those 
problems. The complexity of the situation was revealed in the initial debates, 
because although the majority of the generators were involved in the Joint 
Energy Project (JEP),14 and were arguing for clarity on various points, they 
were simultaneously preparing for separate lobbying processes (to be 
discussed in the next section). However, before they could do that, they needed 
to fully understand the changes in the market and industry at large. The 
individual power stations represented by the JEP all had different needs, as the 
definitions within technical policies had different financial impacts for each site. 
No single power station is built or designed in the same way as another. For 
example, when debating the definitions of shutdown and startup in terms of 
their treatment in the 20,00015 hours ahead, a Head of Environment said: 
The LCPD was a difficult beast… we were trying to define startup and 
shutdowns… it became very obvious that some companies wanted to go 
down one route and others down another, the divisions were obvious.  
As each power station was designed with different technology, the way in which 
these definitions were determined made a difference to what would count 
towards the 20,000 hours, resulting in dissimilar financial consequences. The 
knowledge that the generators exchanged information with the Environment 
                                                 
14 The JEP mainly consisted of environmental managers and engineers. 
15 If the generator chose to opt out of the LCPD they would seek derogation from the regulation that 
would allow them to operate for  20,000 hours without having to comply with the required investment 
to reduce emissions. 
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Agency (EA) to flush out the complications of a directive on paper needed to be 
translated into engineering terms and financial outcomes. Moreover, the way in 
which the emissions would be monitored was also the subject of significant 
debate. Knowledge exchange took place between all parties, and was essential 
to understand the problems that were faced. For example, the generators were 
unhappy with the original directive suggesting how emissions whould be 
monitored: should hours should be counted, per unit, per site or per stack? 
Following the debates, one regulator understood that: 
You can see that the generators with the same power output, they have 
basically the same technology and they are treated differently because of 
some technically ill-informed bureaucrats…we get directives and they 
make claims on what is possible but it is not until we talk to industry that 
they tell us it is not possible unless they are in perfect working conditions, 
so at this point we have to go back to the bureaucrats and say have you 
actually got evidence that this can be done? It is a circulating body of 
knowledge to which people jump into the pot. 
As the stock of knowledge for all the agents became clearer, NPV modelling 
provided a platform to think about the wider picture. It was an extremely 
complicated process, which began with the environmental directive itself. With 
the engineers and regulators working together to consider the situation facing 
them, the aim was to avoid unintended consequences. One Head of Operations 
stated: 
The decision begins with asking yourself how you can survive in the 
market… what will the future electricity prices be like? What size do you 
want your company to be? What technology do you want to be known 
for? You look at the project… how much does it cost to buy land? For 
alternatives what would the price of a gas contract be? What would the 
rent connection be for the location you have chosen? What is the hurdle 
rate for that particular type of project? Because these do vary for 
different projects. 
Projecting pricing curves was an essential aspect of the modelling process, 
completed either in house, or by outside consultants. However, as one General 
Manager of Operations stated: 
The pricing curves are the most difficult, we have a whole range of tools 
that our trading guys use and they have statistical packages that do the 
number crunching, but typically the most difficult thing is the price of carbon 
and knowing what your competitors do - what your competitors do will affect 
the price of electricity going forward. 
Such work needed a team with expertise from different areas of the firm:  
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We have a Commercial Team that are responsible for all big investments. 
If it is a capital project they will go direct to the engineering group. The 
Engineering Group will help with engineering compliance. The trading 
team will also be involved because they will feed in the pricing curves. Of 
course there are legal consults etc. (Head of Coal Operations) 
The information required to complete a model takes a long time to acquire. With 
policies changing and the details of directives being decided upon during the 
planning stage, modelling can take around five years, as explained by one of 
the Environmental Managers: 
When the LCPD was on the horizon, it was like right guys, we’ve got 
five or six years to sort this out… someone will start looking at the kit 
needed so the engineering people, the commercial development team 
will look at the options available to meet this criteria, checks and 
appraisals. I will look at the law and keep them updated as to what is 
happening. The financial stuff happens separately from what I do, all I 
do is make sure they have the right information from an environmental 
point of view. 
The NPV modelling provided an opportunity for the generators to think about 
their own plans and involvement in the JEP. They added to their knowledge by 
furthering their understanding of how their competitors would be conducting 
themselves in this process. This was essential in planning their own conduct 
going forward. 
 
6.2 How agents planned their conduct 
 
The generators planned their conduct using the capital budgeting model to 
bring all the options to the table. The process of how capital investment 
decisions were made, who was involved, and the strategic nature of the 
accounting process that took place as part of the modelling is shown in Table 2. 
Insert here: Table 2 - Stages of the capital budgeting process for the 
LCPD16 
The first step in the introduction of a new environmental directive is for DEFRA, 
the Environment Agency and the generators to work through the directive 
together to understand how to formulate a general policy with targets. Part of 
                                                 
16 Every generator will have their own process, but the interview data show that this is the average process - also note that the 
names of teams will vary from organisation to organisation. 
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each of their contextual analyses is to create a workable framework to enable 
the generators to make decisions about whether to opt in or out of the directive. 
Capital budgeting modelling began during the process of negotiation between 
the EA, JEP, individual generators, and lobbyists. When the Government 
privatised the industry, they declared that investment would become market-
led. “Firms were persuaded to use DCF techniques for investment decisions by 
virtue of their objectivity and superiority to conventional techniques. Economic 
growth would thereby be stimulated, the performance of individual firms 
improved, and the need for direct intervention by Government avoided” (Miller, 
1991: 736). However, this assertion failed to consider the influence of 
politicians’ actions on investments. When the language of capital budgeting 
prevails, the modelling of all investments, including the LCPD, exposes the 
significance of future political policies and current frameworks. It demonstrates 
that to create a model, additional decisions needed to be made to support any 
predictions. This was an important step when the generators were engaged in 
conduct analysis. 
Although the Government had taken a laissez- faire approach, most 
environmental regulations require the generators to select Best Available 
Techniques (BAT)17. However, at this stage the Government either could not or 
would not provide sufficient detail. This became a problem when modelling 
alternative investments. As a Team Coordinator of the EA stated, ‘The 
Government is so feeble in terms of laying down a national strategy’.  
The generators found it difficult to plan their approach to decisions when there 
was little guidance on future policies. It was accepted practice that each project 
must gain the required rate of return and that all actors should recognise this. 
The need for companies to provide required returns was a substantial 
component of their business plans and subsequent discussions.  
This stage of the process took considerable time; in fact, some of the finer 
details were still being debated in 2008, the year when decisions had to be 
made. This first stage involving working with the regulators was important, 
because the right discussions and lobbying could mean the difference between 
a successful project and an unsuccessful one. The generators wanted all the 
details presented in a financial format, so that they could understand the impact 
of the changes they were facing. The regulators were also open to criticism 
because they did not have all the answers. The generators realised they could 
strategically use financial arguments to embed knowledge of ultimate 
                                                 
17“ ‘Best available techniques’ (BAT) means the available techniques which are the best for preventing 
or minimising emissions and impacts on the environment.” https://www.gov.uk/guidance/best-
available-techniques-environmen 
tal-permits 
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consequences into the discussions. They used this to present suggestions of 
what would work to transform the directive from words on a piece of paper to 
something operational. In other words, they were able to plan their conduct 
around the financial data they were modelling. 
This point was affirmed by one of the generators, who said: 
The LCPD is a piece of legislation written by European bureaucrats in 
closed rooms… the definitions were not clear. The Commission went 
overboard in terms of detail and as a result it did not work. One of the 
things we lobbied for to overcome many of these problems was plant-wide 
management and we got that. For other generators the decisions were far 
more complex. 
The withholding of investment by the generators became an act of strategic 
conduct, one of resistance or salvo in a dialectic of control. In the case of the 
LCPD, the process involved negotiating space prior to making decisions. In 
process 2 (see Table 2), the modelling process begins to develop scenarios 
that can be used to decide whether to opt in or out of the directive.  
Completing the full cycle of the business development planning can also be 
seen as conduct analysis. When the modelling is complete, the business plan is 
then checked alongside the model prepared by the accountants. They are 
usually positioned in the ‘Assurance Group’ (also known as the ‘Treasury 
Group’), referred to as stage 3 in Table 2. As one Head of Coal Operations 
stated: 
They don’t crawl over the model but they have to satisfy themselves that it 
is an accurate reflection… not from a technical perspective, from a purely 
economic perspective. 
However, both the General Manager of Operations and the Commercial 
Manager argued that one of the most important checks for all the modelling 
requirements is carried out on underlying transactions, as under IAS 3918 the 
incorrect reporting of items can create problems. One Commercial Manager 
argued: 
One party might look at a capital investment because it looked like the 
right thing to do, but now because of the financial reporting, although the 
underlying transaction is the same, the way it is reported it might not be 
perceived as being a good transaction. 
                                                 
18 Relevant at the time of the interviews. IAS stands for International Accounting Standards 
http://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ias-39-financial-instruments-recognition-and-
measurement/  
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Once the Treasury has signed off the Business Plan, process 4 begins, and the 
Business Plan is submitted to the Board of Directors. The Board does not see 
the modelling itself, but the Business Plan contains the rationale and the 
outcomes of the modelling. In the companies that were interviewed, all parties 
confirmed that the Chief Executive makes the final decision. For the 
investments considered in this case study, Processes 2-4 happened several 
times because the uncertainty within the modelling was so high that it was, in 
many cases, difficult to formulate decisions: 
Earlier on a lot of it is educated guesswork; we have to keep refining the 
model until we get a clearer view. (Head of Coal Operations) 
There was a clear process, almost a ritual that had to be followed to justify the 
decision-making process and the ultimate decision. In addition, it helped them 
to plan future lobbying. The generators had to draw on their knowledge of their 
own company, the actions of their competitors and future moves from the 
regulators and Government. Withholding investing would have a significant 
impact in the UK, but would not stop the parent companies growing because 
each of the large players were international companies who could use their 
capital anywhere in the world. 
The modelling demonstrated the financial consequences of adhering, or not 
adhering, to the regulations established by the EA. The regulators were aware 
that the generators could make things difficult for them, and that they would 
have to share some pain along the way. One regulator said: 
We shared a bit of the pain with them; you can’t shut a plant down if that 
means it will block the actual grid because you will cause more pollution 
doing that. 
By working collaboratively, the regulators and generators increased 
knowledgeability on both sides. The regulators understood how the definitions 
would affect the generators financially, but also became aware of what might 
happen to the supply of the electricity if they did not work together. Additionally, 
the generators were able to work more efficiently to carry out modelling when 
working with the regulator, because they grew to understand how and in what 
ways the market would analyse emissions in the future.  
 
6.3 Actions taken using capital budgeting 
The actions taken on the basis of knowledge derived from capital budgeting 
involved three stages. The first stage involved the generators deciding whether 
or not to opt in or out of the directive. If they opted out, they would be 
requesting a limited life derogation as a result of the 20,000-hour generation 
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scheme (steps 2-4 in Table 2). The generators used the capital budgeting 
modelling to present scenarios: 
We have to model the different scenarios……. we had 15 options running 
with this one. It is more complicated than it looks because we have to 
work with potential suppliers to see if the options are economically viable 
so we have to invest to speculate…..gone are the days where we just put 
a tender out. We were looking for an 8% or 9% return. (Head of Coal 
Operations) 
Each generator had to create the business plans using the outcomes of the 
modelling. The boards would make a decision based on their strategic 
intentions and the economic viability of each power station. The scenarios 
included incoming cashflow from opting for the derogation and shutting the 
plants down. 
In the second stage, those who decide to comply with the directive had to 
decide how they wanted to be governed. During their context analysis of these 
investments and the strategic conduct planning for the lobbying of better 
technical guidance on how the directive could work, the generators had 
managed to convince politicians that two approaches were acceptable. The 
Head of Environment gave this evidence: 
We had Ministers turning up wanting to know why we wanted the National 
Plan rather than the ELV, it was quite an intensive debate…...we got both. 
The two governance approaches were the Emissions Limit Value19 (ELV) and 
the National Emissions Reduction Plan 20  (NERP). Modelling allowed each 
generator to calculate the economic effects of having emissions measured and 
managed in different ways. However, this was, once again, not as 
straightforward as it seems, because they knew there was uncertainty about 
how these rules may have been due to change in 2015. Some generators who 
chose to make a decision before the full information was available in order to 
take action did make mistakes. This explanation was given by one of the 
Environmental Planning Managers: 
The definitions and governance changes made a huge problem for one 
generator who did not hold out for the lobbying to end; they had decided 
                                                 
19 This was where a power station must meet specific limits based on the amounts of 
pollutants produced on a “milligramme per cubic metre of waste gas” basis. This information 
was correct at the time the decisions were taken. 
20 A generating company would be given an allowance, known as a bubble. The bubble would 
be the amount of a pollutant that could be emitted in any given year. The bubble issued under 
NERP would be tradeable within a member state. This information was correct at the time the 
decisions were taken. 
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to fit FGD to half of the plant but they only had one stack so they were left 
hanging…... 
The lobbying process had proved invaluable in improving the accuracy of the 
modelling process. The third action was based on how each generator would 
lobby for change to the market framework. They needed to persuade the 
Government to provide a clearer policy. This applied to both the generators who 
opted out and those who opted in, because the UK now needed new 
investment to replace the power stations that would be closing. The investment 
hiatus started at this point. 
Miller (1991:735) stated: “[f]or differing periods, and with differing effects, 
accounting technologies have been identified as integral to, and enabling of, 
particular strategies of macro-economic government.” The use of regulations to 
achieve control provides contradictions within the system, which serves the 
dialectic of control set up by the generators.  
Giddens (1979:148) stated, “The more tightly-knit and inflexible the formal 
relations of authority within an organisation, in fact, the more the possible 
openings for circumventing them”. The withholding of investment forced the 
Government to engage in a consultation to effect reform, which led to the 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR). Here, capital budgeting did facilitate change 
in societal structures. The ability of generators to use capital budgeting exposed 
the weakness of laissez-faire approaches to energy policies. This also affected 
the general economic health of the country, because these financial incentives 
come from taxpayers.  
Due to the introduction of the revised LCPD, generators were able to take a firm 
stand regarding investment. A significant number of power companies chose to 
opt out of the regulation, because the modelling, lack of secure incentives and 
uncertain policies resulted in risk deemed incompatible with required returns. 
Once the LCPD reform process had concluded, it was apparent that the 
generators were not going to make investments for the sake of it:  
We have to fight for capital; we put the business plans forward, but so do 
Mexico, America and Spain. (Head of Coal Operations) 
However, the biggest problem was not the planned shutdown of the large coal 
and oil plants. In fact, this was a direction that the UK Government favoured; 
i.e. a smaller portfolio of assets reliant on fossil fuel. The more urgent problem 
was stated by the Government in 2007 as: 
Energy companies are also going to be making large investments in the 
coming years to update and replace ageing power stations and 
infrastructure. We need to create the right conditions for this investment, 
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so we get timely and increasingly low carbon supplies. (DTI, Meeting the 
Energy Challenge, White Paper, May 2007). 
Although in 2007 and 2008 the Government remained strong in its emphasis on 
market-led investment, the generators were lobbying for change in incentives 
for new investments. One explanation from the generators was: 
I don’t think they will relax the rules (on emissions21) but I think they will 
pay some kind of capacity payment just in case they need a backup. 
(Head of Coal Operations) 
The problem arose when alternative investments failed to materialise. Some 
companies proposed new gas power stations, but did not build them. A Head of 
Corporate Regulation told us that: 
The most significant thing we need is a clear energy policy by the 
Government. A coherent policy, so for example the Government targets of 
renewables are quite frankly not worth the paper they are written on 
because we do not believe they are achievable... a horrifying bodge you 
would expect from the politicians 22 . For 20 years, the industry have 
spotted that we are reaching the end of the lives of many assets but the 
Government won’t commit on coal power, nuclear etc; it is all sky dreams 
of renewables. First you need policy from Government, then planning, 
then the serious money will come from the big players. 
An Environmental Planning Manager added a typical comment from the big six 
in 2008: 
No one has to keep the lights on anymore, no one at all. I guess under the 
Electricity Act, suppliers have a duty to supply to residential users… I think 
that’s actually required, but nothing in the Act says how they’re going to 
get the stuff they’re going to supply. The argument is the market will meet 
it. So, if we stop generating, the theory is people will panic and give us 
what we want.  
The lack of investment resulted in a shift of power between the Government, 
the regulators and the generators. This became apparent by 2011, when the 
regulators and Government finally accepted that market-led investments were 
not working. The generators’ lobbying of Whitehall23 was beginning to have an 
impact. The generators used their modelling to explain why they were not 
investing, and made a deliberate choice to strategically use accounting to 
demonstrate their arguments. Subordinates started to take strategic action to 
                                                 
21 Added for explanation. 
22 This was based on the position in 2009. 
23 Whitehall is also known as the British Civil Service. 
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instigate change by withholding investment, an action designed to create a level 
of what Giddens (1984) would call dialectic of control. The generators used the 
knowledge they had gained in Stage 1 to instigate market changes. Through 
lobbying and the modelling of future problems and supply issues, the 
Government acknowledged that change was indeed required, as demonstrated 
by the DECC, another industry regulator: 
Security of supply is threatened as existing plants close. Over the next 
decade we will close a quarter (around 20GW) of existing generation 
capacity as old or more polluting plants close. Modelling suggests that the 
de-rated capacity margins could fall below five percent around the end of 
this decade, increasing the likelihood of blackouts. (DECC, 2011:5) 
The White Paper continued: 
There is broad consensus that current market arrangements will not 
deliver the scale of long-term investments needed, at the required pace, to 
meet the challenges… the challenges of decarbonisation and security of 
supply. Nor will they give the customers the best deal. (DECC, 2011:6) 
The environmental investments the Government had favoured back in 2006 
(see above), but which did not materialise, were controlled according to a 
regulatory framework designed to provide some controls over emissions. These 
controls were imposed in a relational sense, because although the Government 
created regulations enabling regulators to control the industry, control only 
resulted if the generators adhered to them, which they did. In many cases, this 
led to a decision not to invest in the UK, because capital budgeting modelling 
showed it was demonstrably more financially effective to invest in other 
countries. Whilst the Government can pass regulation, control of the ability to 
generate or to not generate electricity rests with the generators.  
 
6.4 Outcomes of actions taken based on knowledge  
The generators knew the Government could not continue to hold off any 
intervention indefinitely, because security of supply would become an issue. As 
many interviewees stated, the Government could not let the lights go out. 
Adding to the pressure on the UK Government, the generators also had access 
to and knowledge of overlapping social systems in those countries that 
provided more clarity in their regulations. The generators knew that a lack of 
investment would lead to a change in the market structure, because blackouts 
result in a backlash against the industry and a loss of votes in national 
elections. However, the generators had the option to simply invest capital in a 
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country where more certainty exists. The primary concern of international 
generators is how best to satisfy their shareholders24, not governments.  
Therefore, the uncertainty created by the Government hindered the generators’ 
strategic direction and willingness to pursue development within the UK. The 
generators played on the potential power they could mobilise, which resulted 
from the resources they owned (capital, technology and knowledge) and their 
ability to control production, to eventually force a crisis. The White Paper (2011) 
took steps to start addressing the concerns the generators had raised at the 
beginning of this project in 2006. The modelling process within the investment 
appraisal process highlighted security of supply issues (part of the energy 
trilemma) within the industry, and the generators used this knowledge, 
providing a strong negotiating position. The accounting, i.e. the process of 
modelling, demonstrated the consequences of not changing the market.  
By taking courageous decisions to shut down plants early, those generators 
who opted out helped the industry focus on the emerging security of supply 
issue. The generators’ decision to opt out reasoned that the financial 
implications of continuing would alienate their shareholders, and the accounting 
models provided the evidence they required to explain this to the regulators. 
Many of the generators stated they had nothing to lose. The strategic decision 
to run 20,000 hours hard and fast was taken by most generators to reduce fixed 
costs. The generators were also hoping that if they ran the hours fast, forcing a 
crisis, the Government would rethink their target dates, which would be of 
benefit to the generators. These benefits would include a move towards a more 
secure future energy policy, and possibly an extended allocation of hours, to 
provide security of supply.  
 
7 Discussion 
It was exceptionally naive to believe that market-led investment would work 
without implementing a focused energy policy. The generators used this naivety 
to push for returns on the capacity payment scheme25 to ensure that future 
                                                 
24 Most investors will have other investments, therefore lowering the generating capacity and the 
consequences of power failures and blackouts would be as bad for them as it is for everyone else. To 
support a policy of not investing is not in their interest either. However, the parent company of the UK 
generators will consider the risks involved in long-term investments. If they can secure better returns 
through an investment hiatus they will, or they will divest their assets in that country and move 
location. 
 
25 The capacity payments are that part of the EMR were first introduced in 2014, as mentioned in a 
previous footnote. The market had a capacity payment system, following privatisation; however, it was 
removed when the market structures changed and electricity was sold in the same way as any other 
commodity in 2001. 
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investments could be made in a climate of greater certainty. In this case study, 
we provide evidence to demonstrate that structural change was attributable to 
the strategic conduct of generators, both at the stage of negotiating an 
operational framework for the revised directive and when the generators 
withheld investment on the basis of accounting information. The accounting 
information generated knowledge on which the generators could act, but also 
changed the knowledgeability of the regulators/Government. 
Insert here: Table 3 - Structural changes created through the use of 
accounting information. 
With the generators refusing to invest, the Government could not be seen to be 
letting the lights go out, or to be bailing out an industry which on paper looked 
profitable. The review that commenced in autumn 2010 was inevitable. The 
EMR is the result of that review, and in 2014-15 the first phase of a new market 
structure was completed. Throughout this study the generators, despite being 
under the authority of the regulators and Government, were able to mobilise 
power by drawing on their knowledge, while working within the constraints of 
the current structures. The generators maximised the impact of their own 
resources, the lack of Government resources, and the missing frame of 
reference to highlight their needs, motivated by a desire for improved certainty. 
Accounting models provided the foundations for lobbying for changes, although 
as one member of the regulatory team (working for one of the generators) said:  
NPV is the traditional method we use when looking at any investments 
and also when deciding how to lobby for change; we use this with the 
regulators through our published responses and with Treasury when we 
are acting as king of consultants to demonstrate things to them.  
Capital budgeting plays a significant role in articulating how accounting can 
instigate change in wider social practices. Demonstrating this is one 
contribution of this research. Generators within the electricity generation 
industry drew strategically on their knowledge of the regulatory environment, 
their business and their resources to demand the reconstruction and revision of 
the market structure relative to investment. The use of capital budgeting 
techniques allowed generators to exploit the notion of a ‘double contingency of 
interaction’. This indicates that the reaction of each party or actor to an 
interaction that takes place is dependent upon the responses of others. Each 
party or actor, in effect, has reciprocal opportunities to sanction the actions of 
others. The Government cannot use the process of regulation to create 
sustainable generation if the generators are able to create a negotiation space 
(Warren and Seal, 2018) to drive change using contradictions within the 
trilemma. Therefore, capital budgeting modelling has forced the Government to 
interact once again with the industry (Miller, 1991). The capital budgeting 
process provided an opportunity to expose the contradictory nature of the 
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regulations in place and shifted the power balance in favour of the generators, 
adding further pressure to the trilemma. The generators are able to control the 
process of generation, and utilise the ‘norms’ of shareholders’ demands for 
investment to provide economically sound returns.  
The political negotiations involved in devising new policy have previously 
created barriers to investment, as shown here. The lack of Government 
direction seems to have been the source of the problem, and the capital 
budgeting modelling exposed it. Current uncertainty has provided greater 
leverage to the strategy of investment appraisal, and has become more than 
simply a passive technique. 
In summary, the generators undertook a two-stage lobbying process. First, the 
changes to the implementations of the directive itself included changes to the 
definitions and the ways in which emissions would be monitored. Although not 
all the generators received exactly what they wanted, enough substantive 
changes were made to the directive to demonstrate the power of the 
generators’ strategic conduct. The EA agreed that changes were required once 
they understood the engineering capabilities of the various plants. Ultimately, 
both the EA and the generators agreed that the original directive included 
targets and processes that were either simply not possible or very unlikely. Both 
increased their knowledgeability through the use of the language of capital 
appraisal to demonstrate the economic consequences of the environmental 
directive. 
Second, the generators were clearly hoping for a capacity payment to 
encourage new investment. Such capacity payments were introduced through 
the EMR. However, the way in which this has been implemented has resulted in 
no new significant investment by the six large generators. Consequently, there 
is now a movement among some of them to divest from this side of the 
business. Therefore, the consequences of this lobbying for change has resulted 
in unintended consequences for the generators. The story of what has 
happened since the EMR is complex and requires a new approach to 
understand the consequences of implementing a novel market process. Using 
the methodological brackets of agents’ conduct and context analysis, 
interviewing and documentary analysis focuses attention on eliciting knowledge 
and understanding agents in terms of the analysis that they apply towards their 
own situations and the situations of those they are trying to influence. Through 
this analysis, researchers might then identify the specific choices made to alter 
the actions of others, and thus the structural elements of systems. 
This review of how senior managers in the electricity generation companies 
acted to address the energy trilemma offers an example of a clear application of 
strategic conduct analysis. They drew reflexively on their knowledge of the 
contradictory positions of the EU regulators (reducing emissions) and the GB 
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Government (in terms of keeping prices low for consumers and maintaining 
security of supply); of the resources available to them as providers of capital; of 
the environmental impact of different methods of electricity generation; and of 
the presentation of evidence in the form of capital budgets. In addition to their 
knowledge of context, they understood the extent to which they could resist 
those in authority and what the conduct of the regulators and the Government 
might be, in order to shape the framework for the implementation of the LCPD 
through a capacity payment system. They were able to enact what Giddens’ 
(1984) termed a dialectic of control, and what Stones (2005) reframes as 
concepts of reflexivity and resistance. In doing so, the perspective and 
knowledgeability of the regulators, Government and, to some extent, the public, 
was altered. This, in turn, led to reallocation of resources; amendments to rules 
and routines, and reconsideration of what constituted normative behaviours.  
Expressed differently, structural change was a result of strategic conduct, 
including a deliberate choice in the use and presentation of capital budgeting by 
generators. Theoretically, this allows us to extend our understanding of ST in 
an accounting context by viewing accounting as not simply being embodied in 
rules, routines, resources and norms, but as a strategic choice in 
communication. We can perceive how agents conduct themselves by using 
accounting in persuasive discussions and arguments, both oral and written. 
When other agents accept or adopt such communications, and these become 
part of their own knowledge and arguments, then structures change to 
accommodate new knowledge, either as the original agents intended or 
otherwise.  
8. Conclusions 
This case study has demonstrated how the strategic conduct of the generators 
included using accounting to produce change in the structure, knowledgeability 
and processes of the market. The case study also shows that the concept of a 
dialectic of control allowed generators within the electricity generation industry 
to demand reconstruction and revision of the market structure relative to 
investment. The paper also demonstrates how the Government and regulators 
were forced to take the concerns of the generators seriously due to an 
investment hiatus. Rather than mobilising their resources, the generators held 
their capital back. The need for resources to tackle emissions provided the 
industry with sufficient evidence to force the Government to consider the 
problem of energy as not just one of the price paid by consumers, but also of 
long-term supply and environmental sustainability, demanding further 
investment. The knowledgeability of the generators also played an essential 
role in effecting change in the rules and structures of the markets within which 
they operate - rules and resources that impact investment directly. However, 
recent changes in the energy markets arising from the falling prices of oil, and 
pressure for renewable resources, means the value and use of capital 
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budgeting by managers and the Government should be kept under observation 
by researchers to enable the structuration processes in accounting practice to 
be understood more fully, particularly in industrial contexts. 
As well as contributing to knowledge of how strategic investment decision-
making takes place within energy markets, an under-researched area, we also 
make a theoretical contribution to structuration theory as it is used in accounting 
research. Stones’ (2005) development of the epistemology of ST is 
strengthened through the empirical evidence presented in this study, which 
shows how persuasive arguments, using the language and logic of accounting, 
can change structures. Whilst further theoretical development is necessary, the 
contribution made here is a greater understanding of how accounting can be 
used (or misused or abused, as Jack (2017) posits) in attempts to change 
organisational and societal systems. Based on the evidence from this case, we 
suggest that researchers pay more attention to the precise nature and choice of 
accounting communications made by agents with a strategic interest in making 
or preventing change. 
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Appendix - Interview questions 
The questions are representative of the questions in the main data collections 
period; however, it should be noted that the exploratory interviews and follow up 
interviews focused on different areas. Later interviews focused on the 
outcomes. 
 
1.Name  
2. Job title  
3.Have you worked in this industry or been associated with this industry within 
any other roles than your current position?  
4.Company  
5.How long have you worked in or been associated with the industry  
The following two questions are very much open ended and I am interested in 
your thoughts and knowledge:  
6.In terms of how the industry has changed,  what would you say have been the 
biggest changes?  
7.How would you describe the current position of the UK electricity industry – 
what are the main issues and who do they involve?  
Now I have some specific questions which as I explained early may repeat 
some of the issues you have just discussed but they have evolved from the 
research framework that I am using for this project.  
8.Are you / were you involved in the LCPD as part of your role? If so, how?  
9.How did you get to understand the requirements and implications of the 
LCPD? For example did you have training, informal conversations with other 
people in the industry etc....  
10.How were / how do you think the decisions to opt in or out of the LCPD were 
made?  How did you plan for these changes? The regulator provides a guide on 
how to determine the decision but do you think this was used as part of the 
process or simply to submit the decision made by other internal processes?  
11. In an ideal world how do you think investments decisions should be made, 
on what basis? For example in the 1960s investment decisions were made 
based upon predicted growth of electricity needs  
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12. In the real world what do you think drives investment decisions in this 
sector?  
13. Who would you say are the main people involved in the LCPD process?  
14. How influential is accounting in the communication process of the LCPD 
process? On the PPC document, although there is a small section for cost/ 
benefit it is only one small section of this document.  
15. Over  your career in this industry / being associated with this industry how 
has the use of accounting changed?  
16. The industry has many different professionals involved for example 
engineers, accountants and regulators.  Have you seen any changes in the 
influence of these roles within the industry.  
17. How can professionals in this industry influence decisions, for example, the 
regulators can use the law if organisations are not complying with the various 
regulations.  
18. The energy sector at the moment is currently having to comply with 
environmental directives set by the EU and other sources, ensure there is 
security of supply and generate profit – if you had to put these in order of 
importance how would you rank them with the first being the most important.  
19. Based on your previous answer, over the course of your career in this 
sector have you witnessed any changes in this ranking?  
20. When making investment decision in the UK electricity industry what 
information is gathered to make these decisions / do you think is drawn upon?  
21. Now we have discussed my questions have you got any other information 
which you would like to add?  
Additional questions if relevant to the person being interviewed:  
22. What was the cost of FDG?  
23. Do you think the regulators anticipated as many opt outs?   
24. Information from regulators – was everything clear? How did you lobby the 
regulators if you required more information?  
25. Did the regulators change any of their policies, standpoints due to the 
lobbying from other parties?  
26. Do you see the industry changing in the future in relation to regulation – 
more, less or stay the same.  
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27. How closely did the environment teams and the Environment Agency work 
together of the problems of the LCPD?  
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